APPROVED FOR RELEASE Historical Collections Division

PRESENT: General Smith, Messrs. Dulles, Wisner, Wolf, Becker, Helms, Earman General Smith: General Smith: A. Referred to a cable Concerning the JCS proposal on Military Command relationships involving CIA in theaters of operations and stated that (1) we must realize that in the long run a theater commander during time of war would run his theater as he saw fit; (2) it would, therefore, be difficult to establish "iron-clad rules"; (3) he preferred to leave out of any paper prepared on this subject the Department of Army's slant that CIA components be placed under technical and operational control of a special force commander who would be a staff officer under the theater commander. Mr. Wisner noted he agreed with the Director but stated it appeared that Gen. McClure might be attempting to come through the "back door" on this problem. After	HR 70-14	Deputies meeting
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Mr. Wisner:		
Mr. Wisner: b. Noted that Senator Bingham's Loyalty Board had asked to appear in connection with the case and that General Counsel had been so		· ·
Mr. Wisner: b. Noted that Senator Bingham's Loyalty Board had asked to	C	c. Raised the question of procedure in submitting our cold-war programs to PSB and asked whether the Director desired to go over them first prior to consideration by Mr. Joyce and Gen. Magruder. The Director said that (1) he felt at the present time the latter course would be preferable; however, we

(CONTINUED)





Mr. Wisner (Cont'd.)

would only undertake those programs we could actually carry out and which all concerned fully supported; (2) the programs would then be submitted to PSB for its consideration; (3) programs submitted by State, Defense and PSB should first be considered by the Staff, i.e. Messrs. Joyce, Jackson and Gen. Magruder. Mr. Wisner recommended that we retain some flexibility in the submission of our projects and/or programs to the Staff since it would be desirable in certain instances not to place some projects and/or programs before the PSB. The Director concurred but stated we should use the Staff for screening purposes insofar as was practicable.

c. Referred to a previous discussion regarding interdiction of certain shipping. The Director stated this would be an excellent idea if it could be accomplished.

